This article analyzes the level of disclosure of financial instruments in the financial statements of Brazilian companies in light of the requirements of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). We examined the annual reports of a sample of 24 nonfinancial firms provided to the Brazilian and the American capital markets for the years from 2002 to 2006. The main results are that the reports to the Brazilian market have an average disclosure level that it statistically inferior to the level of the reports released to the American market, and firms in regulated sectors, firms with a longer history of issuing ADRs and larger firms show higher levels of disclosure.
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INTRODUCTION
he level of disclosure of companies in their accounting reports has been a fertile area for academic studies. The disclosure of accounting information, for instance, helps reduce information asymmetry, sheds light on the volatility of stock returns and can also be an indicator for both domestic and foreign investors in making their choices (Levine, Loayza & Beck, 2000; Love, 2003) . Among the standards issued by the IASB, here we focus on International Financial
Reporting Standard no. 7 (IFRS 7), which covers disclosure of financial instruments. One of the reasons for this choice is the difficulty faced by firms to implement the specific accounting requirements for the treatment of financial instruments, especially derivatives (Wallace & Williams, 2002; Bhamornsiri & Schroeder, 2004) . Furthermore, transactions with financial instruments, if not properly managed, can cause serious losses to companies (Aguiar & Hirano, 2003; Hernandez, 2003; Valor On-Line, 2011) , so shareholders need sufficient information on these transactions, an aspect where Brazil is deficient (Costa Júnior, 2003; Murcia & Santos, 2009 ).
The disclosure of financial instruments by Brazilian companies has been investigated by other authors, such as Costa Júnior (2003) and Board) is not satisfactory, and that the reports released to the American capital market are more complete than those provided to the Brazilian market.
Based on the context of adaptation of Brazilian firms to international accounting standards and the different treatment and disclosure of information between distinct capital markets, our objectives are to analyze the level of disclosure of financial instruments supplied by Brazilian companies in their accounting reports and to identify possible characteristics/factors related to a greater/lesser level of disclosure.
Studies of this disclosure in the context of Brazilian firms is particularly interesting because of the better possibilities of cross-sectional variations in the levels of disclosure (Lopes & Alencar, 2010) , a situation that can be different in more developed capital markets. We chose nonfinancial companies for this study because the trading of certain financial instruments, such as derivatives, is not part of their operational context in Brazil. This same exclusion has been made in other studies of disclosure practices, such as Naser & Nuseibeh (2003) , Akhtaruddin (2005) and Alsaeed (2006).
THE RELEVANCE OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
Lopes & Martins (2005, p. 31) state that as external users, "investors do not have the same level of information as company managers, so they need independent instruments to evaluate the real situation." Therefore, when a company does not provide complete disclosure in its reports, the information that reaches external users can paint a picture of less risk than that really faced by the firm, among other problems (Lopes & Lima, 1998, p. 9) . Ceteris paribus, the greater the level of disclosure, the lower investors' uncertainty will be in their decisions (Poshakwale & Courtis, 2005) . This has been long recognized, as reflected in the statement of Horngren (1957, p. 598 The incomplete supply of information causes information asymmetry (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000) , which directly impacts the basic objective of accounting. Iudícibus, Martins & Carvalho (2005, p. 11) stress that "diminishing or counteracting information asymmetry is one of the most important tasks of modern accounting, which in this aspect [...] , has reached the stature of a science." The commitment of firms to better disclosure levels reduces the severity of information asymmetry between the firm on the one hand and its shareholders and potential investors on the other (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000) . Specifically, the quality of accounting information has positive effects on the perception of market participants about the distribution of future cash flows of the company, also impacting decisions based on the forecast cash flows (Lambert, Leuz & Verrecchia, 2007) .
Bushman, Piotroski & Smith (2004) point out that for listed corporations, transparency means equal availability of information. According to Lima et al. (2006, p. 548) ,
"shareholders expect management to prepare the most transparent accounting statements possible." Therefore, the themes of accounting disclosure and transparency also involve the theme of corporate governance, because one of the four pillars of good governance is the principle of transparency, whereby besides the duty to inform, managers must cultivate a desire to inform (IBGC, 2003) .
According to Coffee (1999) and Khanna, Palepu & Srinivasan (2004) , there is a tendency to create a relatively uniform governance structure to be adopted worldwide by firms. This structure is based on the converging orientations, which according to those authors can be divided into two groups: i) legal convergence (e.g., requiring stricter application of legal rules); and ii) functional convergence (e.g., requiring the adoption of the accounting principles recommended by the IASB).
For Malacrida & Yamamoto (2006, p. 69) , transparency, and consequently disclosure "is one of the pillars of corporate governance, with great emphasis on all the reflections on the subject and also present in the majority of existing codes." In this same line, Ho & Wong (2001, p. 142) consider that "Transparency is the biggest indicator of the standard of corporate governance in the economy"
Given the importance of the transparency of accounting information -enabled by disclosure -it is relevant to study this disclosure by public corporations. 
DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
The business environment is one of inherent risks. According to PWC (2000) , these risks can come from the specific market segment, changes in financing opportunities, contracts for future delivery, among many other aspects. One of the crucial sources of risk is that from financial markets. According to Saito and Schiozer (2004, p. 1) , "the volatility of the financial markets can affect firms significantly, even causing them to fail." To protect against this volatility, such risks can be managed through the use of derivative financial instruments. "Derivatives provide an effective and inexpensive way for final users to protect against and manage the risks inherent to interest rates, commodity prices or exchange rates" (Carvalho, 2002, p. 38) .
Due to the characteristics of the accounting treatment of firms' commitments, it may not be possible to account for them, and hence to disclose them in the traditional accounting statements, such as the balance sheet. This leads to so-called off-balance-sheet items, typical examples of which are commitments for future purchase or sale of goods or assets. According to Lopes & Carvalho (1999, p. 6) , the absence of recognition of financial instruments on the balance sheet is a "very serious problem, since external users of accounting information do not have access the volume of transactions of the organization analyzed through its accounting statements."
However, even though these transactions cannot be disclosed in the body of the balance sheet, the company should reveal them in the notes, so that external users can make more informed decisions. In this respect, the accounting standard-setting entities play a key role in requiring firms to comply with minimum disclosure levels.
According to international accounting standards, the disclosure of financial instruments is regulated by IFRS 7, as mentioned before. Its objective is to require firms to provide information in their financial reports to enable users to assess: i) the significance of financial instruments to the financial position and performance of the firm; and ii) the nature and extent of the risks arising from financial instruments to which the firm is exposed during the period and on the reporting date, and how the firm manages those risks. Among the specific requirements are minimum levels of disclosure of credit risk, liquidity risk and market risks (IASB, 2008b) . The requirements apply to both qualitative and quantitative aspects of disclosure, which together should provide a fair overview of the use of financial instruments by the firm and its exposure to the risks resulting therefrom. The values of financial instruments should be booked observing classification into five categories. There are no rules on disclosure of other revenues and expenses specifically related to financial instruments Firms should disclose in the financial statements of notes on revenues, expenses, losses and gains in the five categories established by the standard. The international accounting standards are much more detailed regarding the aspects that should be disclosed.
Firms should disclose the market value of each class of financial assets and liabilities in a form that allows comparison with the accounting value. Chart 1: Some points of divergence between Brazilian and international accounting standards on disclosure of financial instruments Source: CVM (2011).
QUALITY OF DISCLOSURE AND ITS DETERMINANTS
Discussion of the quality of the disclosure of information in firms' accounting reports is not recent (Horngren, 1957) . A consultation of the articles previously published along with the standards issued recently in Brazil on the treatment of transactions with financial instruments (CVM, 2008a, for example) gives an idea of the disparities in the requirements on disclosure according to Brazilian, American and international standards. We next briefly review the literature in this respect. Darós, Borba & Abreu (2005) , comparing the disclosure of transactions with derivatives in the accounting reports in the Brazilian and American markets, found significant differences, with the reports published in the United States supplying more complete information than those in Brazil, even when examining Brazilian firms with securities traded in both markets. In a similar study, reasonable to expect that dual-listed Brazilian firms will tend to be stingier about disclosing information in their accounting reports to the Brazilian market than those to the American market, with the latter being nearer to meeting the minimum disclosure levels recommended by international standards.
Since some Brazilian firms do not fully meet the requirements already issued by the CVM for disclosure of financial instruments (Costa Júnior, 2003; Múrcia & Santos, 2009 ) and the disclosure of Brazilian companies is different in different capital markets, we formulated the first hypothesis: Hypothesis 1 (H1) -The index of the disclosure of financial instruments of Brazilian companies in the Brazilian market is statistically different than that of their disclosure to the American market.
There are arguments that larger firms tend to have better disclosure levels (Horngren, 1957; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000) . One of the explanations is that larger organizations have more complete information systems, allowing them to generate more detailed information at lower unit cost (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007) . Therefore, based on this argument and previous empirical findings (Alsaeed, 2006; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007) , we expect to find a positive relationship between firm size and the level of disclosure, leading to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2) -There is a positive relationship between firm size and level of disclosure of financial instruments.
Because one of the pillars of good corporate governance practices is transparency, it is reasonable to expect firms with securities listed for trading in markets segments that require enhanced governance to have better levels of disclosure than firms not so listed. Gallon (2006) found a positive association between the disclosure practices present in management reports and participation of companies in differentiated corporate governance levels. For
Brazilian financial institutions, Costa, Goldner & Galdi (2007) showed that the participation in one of the three segments of the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BM&FBovespa) requiring enhanced corporate governance is a factor influencing disclosure levels. This leads to our third hypothesis: Hypothesis 3 (H3) -Adherence to one of the enhanced governance segments of the BM&FBovespa is positively related to the disclosure index.
According to Lopes & Rodrigues (2007) , some economic sectors can have greater institutional pressures for disclosure of information than others. In particular, companies in regulated sectors face requirements to reveal accounting information from the respective regulatory agencies that are typically more stringent than those required of firms in general, prompting them to provide more detailed information in their reports, indirectly affecting the According to Khanna, Palepu & Srinivasan (2004) , the disclosure level required in the American capital market is high. For dual-listed companies, the need to report more comprehensive information to the American market can carry over to their accounting reports in Brazil, leading to our final hypothesis: Hypothesis 5 (H5) -Companies with a longer history of issuing accounting reports in the American market have higher disclosure levels than those that just recently started issuing reports to both markets. In 2000, the procedures for disclosure of financial instruments in line with international standards were regulated by IAS 32 and IAS 39. For our study period, these procedures were regulated by IFRS 7, requiring some modifications in that data collection instrument.
DATA AND METHODS

SELECTING THE COMPANIES AND OBTAINING THE REPORTS
Therefore, we analyzed that questionnaire in light of IFRS 7, resulting in a new instrument composed of 45 questions, contained in Appendix B (also indicating the excluded questions).
The reduction in the number or questions was due to the changes in the international standards. For example, IFRS 7 no longer has the requirement for disclosure of the fair value of derivatives during the year, so that question was excluded from the original instrument.
The adapted questionnaire has the same characteristics as that prepared by Lopes & Rodrigues (2007) , namely: i) all variables are dichotomous (dummies); ii) equal weighting of all the questions (assuming that all the components have equal importance for inclusion in the statements); and iii) adjustment for items no longer applicable (to prevent the index from being biased due to companies not disclosing information no longer required).
To achieve consistency in application of the mentioned instrument, we prepared a working paper for consultation during the analysis of the reports, composed of clarifications about what should be present regarding each item of the questionnaire. For example, for the question on the accounting policies adopted for financial assets available for sale, we assigned points only when the company disclosed a specific accounting policy for this type of asset.
We considered it to be not applicable when the company stated it did not trade in such instruments (or did not own any on the date of the analysis Based on the content analysis using the data collection instrument, we assigned scores,
representing "a quantitative assessment of the disclosure practices of the companies. They are not a qualitative indicator of the value of this information" (Khanna, Palepu & Srinivasan, 2004, p. 482) . Since all the questions are dichotomic, when the report satisfied a certain item we assigned the value of 1 to the variable, and 0 otherwise. Equation 1 below shows how the scores were calculated for each firm. We calculated the total of applicable questions according to Equation 2, also shown in Chart 1, and then computed the disclosure index of each firm according to Equation 3 in the chart.
We measured the size of the companies by the natural logarithm of total assets (figures obtained from the Economática database). This variable consists of the value of all the assets and rights held by the company in each year analyzed. We used a dummy variable for the level of corporate governance, assigning a value of 1 for firms listed for trading in any of the three enhanced governance segments of the BM&FBovespa and 0 for firms not so listed.
Likewise, we used a dummy variable for firms in regulated sectors (telecommunications, electricity and oil & gas), assigning a value of 1 to these firms and 0 for others. Finally, we between companies and year, by which the response parameters are constant for all the firms and also for all the time periods (Duarte, Lamounier & Takamatsu, 2007) . Equation 2 below describes the model used (Model 1).
Where: below, the only difference being the dependent variable, which is the disclosure index for Form 20F. Other variables: Identical to Equations 2 and 3.
The idea behind the last model, considering the differences between the disclosure levels to the American and Brazilian markets, is to identify possible characteristics of companies associated with a higher/lower difference between the content of the reports provided to the two capital markets.
RESULTS
ANALYSIS OF THE DISCLOSURE INDEXES
After analyzing the accounting reports, we obtained 240 disclosure indexes. Table 1 presents an exploratory analysis of the scaled variables. Appendix C, which describes the points where the disclosure practices of Brazilian firms depart the most from IFRS 7.
As indicated in Appendix C, although the disclosure requirements of Form 20F are nearer the international requirements, the two types of reports present points of deficiency in relation to the international standards (which is coherent with the results of Table 1 ). Perhaps from investors' standpoint, for example, the disclosure of accounting policies for assets/liabilities held for trading is not as relevant as the presentation of a sensitivity analysis referring to interest rate risk. In other words, depending on the user of accounting information, failure to satisfy some items required by international standards may not have a great impact, but we assume that if the company has an adequate disclosure level, this care will assure the supply of relevant information to the different types of users, since each one might be more interested in a specific topic. This information can even be extended to disclosure of items that are not mandatory (voluntary disclosure). Notes: DisclDPF -level of disclosure in the DPF; Discl20F -level of disclosure in the 20F; Differencedifference between the disclosure in the Form 20F and DPF; Difference in % -how much the difference between the level of disclosure of the reports represents over the disclosure index of the DFP; CorrelationPearson's correlation coefficient between the DFP and 20F disclosure levels. *** significant at 0.1%; ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
As shown in Table 2 , the average disclosure index during the five years studied increased steadily for the two types of reports. Also, during the entire period, the disclosure level of the firms' 20F forms was greater than that of their DFP reports, by an average of 39%. A pairwise t-test indicated that the difference between the two accounting reports (DFP x 20F) was statistically significant at 0.1% in all years (even for the same company), indicating no rejection of H1, a result in line with previous findings in the literature. The correlation between the reports was also significant and positive. In other words, there appears to be a tendency for firms with more complete reports in one market also to publish more complete reports in the other market.
ANALYSIS OF THE POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF THE DISCLOSURE LEVEL
To analyze the hypotheses considering the joint effect of all the variables and their respective influence on the other variables, we performed regression of panel data with fixed effects for year and cross-section. The results are shown in Table 3 below. We first analyzed the residuals of the regression. For Models 1 and 2 these presented the following characteristics (Hair et al., 2005) : i) they were random variables with mean equal to zero; ii) they were normally distributed (Jarque-Bera test); iii) they had independent distribution (absence of patterns); and iv) they had constant variance (when necessary, we performed correction by means of the White test for heteroskedasticity Based on the results shown in Table 3 , hypothesis 2, that there is a positive relationship between the size of the firms and their disclosure level, was corroborated for the two types of reports, because the p-value is below 0.05. In other words, the larger the firm, the higher the level of disclosure of financial instruments tends to be. The theory according to which larger companies generate more detailed information with lower unit costs appears to hold for our sample of companies.
The hypothesis that listing in a trading segment requiring higher corporate governance is related to greater disclosure levels (H3) was not corroborated, but it was also not refuted.
The betas found were negative for the two types of report, indicating an inverse relationship in this case. In other words, companies with securities listed for trading in differentiated corporate governance segments tend to have lower average disclosure indexes. This goes against the theoretical expectation, but the result was not statistically significant.
On this matter, it should be considered that all the companies analyzed were issuers of ADRs, for which reason they already had to meet a higher standard of disclosure. This might explain this counterintuitive result for listing in enhanced governance segments. Still, a positive but not significant result would not be as surprising as the negative coefficients found. Regarding the fourth hypothesis, it was also confirmed in this initial analysis. In other words, companies in regulated sectors tended to have higher disclosure levels, at 0.05 significance.
For the DFP reports, H5 was not rejected, and the hypothesis was also confirmed for the Form 20F reports, but without significance. Therefore, the time of issuing ADRs was positively related to the quality of the accounting reports measured by the level of disclosure of financial instruments. Since the DFP reporting rules are not as exigent as those for Form 20F, we believe firms listed longer on the NYSE tended to supply more detailed information on their DFP than those listed on that exchange more recently, which can indicate a learning effect. In other words, firms with more experience of issuing accounting reports to the American market appear to have a tendency to disclose more complete information to the Brazilian market, through a carry-over effect. American. We found that the accounting reports of the Brazilian firms in our sample fell shy to different degrees from the requirements of the IASB for disclosure of financial instruments.
This difference of degree (statistically significant) occurred in relation to the two markets, with the Form 20F reports departing less from the IASB requirements than the DFP reports.
None of the 240 accounting reports analyzed were prepared according to the international standards, so the firms did not have an obligation to meet those requirements.
Therefore, the differences found between the standards for preparation of the two reports This result is aligned with the theory and also with the results of previous studies. However, unlike expected, the fact of firms being listed for trading in enhanced corporate governance segments of the BM&FBovespa presented a negative relation with the level of disclosure, although it was not significant for the firms analyzed. The consideration of the existence of a trend for create a globally uniform governance structure, with respect to functional convergence, was not borne out because the firms with higher corporate governance levels in Brazil were those with the lowest indexes of disclosure of financial instruments.
In contrast, the fact of being in a regulated sector was positively and significantly associated with the disclosure level. Finally, in relation to the last hypothesis tested, there was a positive influence of the time listed on the NYSE on the quality of disclosure. These two results suggest a learning effect: the experience of heightened reporting requirements, whether from regulators or due to the time of issuing reports to the American market, appears to prompt companies indirectly to provide more detailed information on financial instruments in their accounting reports. Hence, for the firms studied in this article, the sector of activity is a better indicator of more complete accounting reports that being listed in an enhanced corporate governance trading segment. It should be noted that there are no economic incentives in Brazil for firms to provide more disclosure in financial statements, and this could have been a factor contributing to the low level of disclosure found in accounting reports. This observation is even more justified when noting that these firms have the necessary information (because they report it in their 20F forms) but do not always disclose it in full to the Brazilian market.
Two limitations of the present study should be noted, related to the selection of companies: i) the exclusion of financial institutions from the sample; and ii) the inclusion of only Brazilian companies with ADRs traded on the NYSE, belonging to different sectors of the economy.
Nevertheless, we believe this study contributes to research on the challenges posed by convergence of accounting standards, which is a relevant issue in both the corporate and academic spheres. We also expect this study will contribute to future research on disclosure 
